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1Introduction
Standard accounts of French industrialization blame the predominance of the
traditional family firm for France’s failure to adopt or to pioneer modern production
methods.  Economic historians could easily interpret the cave coopérative vinicole as
evidence that corroborates this explanation for inefficiency in French agriculture and
industry.  The cave coopérative preserved the idiosyncrasies that attend fragmented
land tenure at the expense of governance costs and incentive problems associated
with cooperative ownership and control.  These apparent barriers to rationalized
production notwithstanding, this paper claims that the cooperative was a
progressive organizational structure that adapted winegrowers in southern France
to the emerging institutions of a growing market.1  That cooperatives were, in
some sense, defensive measures, designed to prolong the profitability of existing
institutions and capabilities, does not preclude their also being efficient.
Collective enterprises inspired by capitalism, they won, on the
level of production and marketing, the membership of most
winegrowers; they brought archaic structures to bear on a
capitalist market, and succeeded in giving an artisanal craft
modern production and competitive marketing.  The ties
tightened between the viticulturist and the cooperative that
absorbed him, forming a screen against the market
(Gavingnaud, 1983, p. 424, translation mine).
                                                 
1 My argument echoes the finding of John Vincent Nye (1987), who confirims the “revisionist”
view that entrepreneurial failure and small firm size were not responsible for retarded economic
growth in the 19th-century French cotton, wool, and flour industries.
2Small French winegrowers formed these wine-making cooperatives
beginning in the early twentieth century, with the most dramatic growth
occurring between the World Wars.  The importance of caves cooperatives
continues; in 1987 1160 cooperatives made 42% of the wine produced in France
(Niederbacher, 1988, p. 32).  And the Midi, where most French cooperatives are
located, “alone produces 35-40 million hectolitres, 12-13% of the world total”
(Niederbacher, 1988, p. 25).  In this paper, I analyze the appearance and
persistence of vinification cooperatives in the Midi, the four chief wine-
producing departments of which are Garde, Aude, Hérault, and Pyrénées
Orientals.
From the phylloxera blight of the 1870’s to the overproduction and fraud
of early in this century, a confluence of exogenous and endogenous pressures
forced a dis-integration of vinification and viticulture.  My thesis is that, given
the existing institutional arrangements and configuration of capabilities, small
growers rationally adopted cooperative vinification to market wine to a rapidly
integrating national and international market, and to utilize the resources and
technology dominant in wine production.  This organizational evolution
preserved the independent, small-scale viticulture practiced by the farmer-
owners of the cooperative.  Mine is an argument about change in organizational
structures when the minimum efficient scale of part of an integrated multi-stage
production process changes dramatically.
3I do not argue that the vinification cooperative was an optimally efficient
organizational adaptation in a static, technological sense; I argue, rather, that this
adaptation was dynamically efficient, given the institutional environment.  I
argue, that is, that vinification cooperatives allowed existing institutions and
capabilities to remain profitable when market conditions turned against the
constellation of small, independent winemakers that covered the Midi.  This
conception of dynamic efficiency might be thought of in terms of “fitness.”
What makes organizational structure fit “is only the ability to induce successful
actions on a particular market given a particular institutional regime” (Koppl
and Langlois, 1994, p. 87).  Vinification cooperatives were fit because they
proved adequate to sustain small-scale viticulture despite technological change
that favored large vintners.  I make the additional claim, defended below, that
vinification cooperatives were more fit than alternative forms of organization.
My conception of dynamic efficiency, then, is about comparative fitness within a
particular institutional environment.
As I explain below, one cannot construe the formation of these
cooperatives as a response to marginal incentives.  Rather, to borrow from an
account of market expansion in late 19th century US history, “Inadequate
information and economic coercion, produced by complexity, anonymity,
dependency, and concentrations of power, invited, if not demanded, public
policy responses” (Carstensen, 1995, p. 588).  The French government provided
legislative support and start-up capital for most of these cooperatives.  Although
4cooperatives’ genesis was largely a matter of public policy, their persistence
reflects profitability in an increasingly competitive market.  I use a transactions-
cost approach to argue that cooperative vinification was the least-cost path of
reorganization that would allow small proprietors to coexist in a market
dominated by large estates and Grands Crus appellations.
The story I tell here differs with traditional accounts of industrial
development.  Though in many industries mass production required vertical
integration to assure the continuous flow of production from raw material to
retail distribution, mass production of wine required dis-integration.  Small scale
wine production, previously an integrated, cottage-type industry, dis-integrated,
separating the processes of viticulture and vinification.  And instead of
expediting the flow of product to market, one key function of the cooperative
was to withhold wine when prices were low.  Increased specialization
accompanied this evolution, but no integrated “factory system” emerged despite
the need to monitor inputs for the sake of quality control.2
Most economic models of cooperative formation portray the process as an
integration upstream into supplies, or downstream into marketing.  (See, for
example, Sexton, 1986.)  Caves coopératives, however, institutionalized a dis-
integration.  Compared to small, independent winegrower-winemakers,
cooperative members participated in an operationally less integrated production
                                                 
2 I have come across one exception: “In the sandy wastes of the upper Camargue, next to the
department of  the Gard, a whole new vinyard sprang up after 1919.  There small railways ran
5process.  My labeling of cooperative formation as “dis-integration” is admittedly
a relative judgment, however.  Dis-integration occurred as growers relinquished
effective control of the vinification and marketing functions.  But on the level of
the wine industry, the cooperative movement signified a consolidation; and as a
matter of law, cooperative members collectively retained ownership of the entire
process.  Not surprisingly, then, some of the same forces that caused managerial
capitalism to succeed personal capitalism in Chandler’s (1977) account also gave
rise to the cave coopérative vinicole.  Social, economic, and geographic mobility
increased, lower transportation costs favored high-volume distribution, and
branding became essential to differentiating a product in impersonal markets.
Although Chandler’s managerial capitalism served a coordination
function that arguably replaced the market coordination of the price mechanism,
vinification cooperatives provided a different sort of coordination.  Their role
was to effect government-sanctioned cartel-like coordination of production,
thereby using the price mechanism to reduce the extent of supply-side
disequilibrium.  Cooperative marketing accomplished this coordination.
Cooperative vinification collectivized more than it coordinated the actual
production of wine.  As I discuss below, this larger scale of vinification both
increased the economic value of the product and increased the market power, or
at least the bargaining power, of its producers.
                                                                                                                                      
between the vines, bringing the grapes harvest to huge mechanized ‘wine factories,’ some of
which could store 100,000 hectolitres a year” (Warner, p. 77).
6I organize this treatment of organizational change and vinification
cooperatives in France’s Midi as follows.  First, I outline a history of winemaking
in southern France, culminating with the emergence of the cooperative form of
production.  Second, I present a theory that interprets cooperative vinification as
a response to changes in the competitive environment, production technology,
and demand characteristics.  Third, I compare the vinification cooperative to
alternative organizational forms in an effort to assess its relative efficiency.  I
conclude with some observations on the present and future of cooperative
winemaking.
History
Early Development
Historical accident shaped the institutional environment that would eventually
favor cooperative winemaking.  Arab and Roman engineering created a system
of dams and canals that enhanced the fertility of the plains of Languedoc-
Roussillon, the region that would typify wine production in the Midi, allowing
productive cereal cultivation in this region characterized by a long growing
season and mild winters.  The imperative of dependable irrigation caused local
civil codes to focus on water rights, establishing a juridical tradition in the
promotion of agriculture (Gavingnaud, 1983, p. 56).  Furthermore, long before
the French Revolution, the institution of private property had enfranchised small
farmers.  Feudalism was never as ubiquitous in the Midi as it was in the North,
7and assertions of royal sovereignty over the local nobility consistently
undermined feudal obligations, though France did not formally annex much of
Roussillon until 1659  (Gavingnaud, 1983, p. 99). By the 13th century, a large
number of small farmers were either free landowners or paid modest seigniorial
taxes, and farmers without legal title to their land were still considered in a
position to sell their limited interest (Gavingnaud, 1983, p. 103).
As population decreases of the 14th and 15th centuries left many small
farms abandoned, lords resorted to granting free title to farmers who would
farm their lands for the payment of a modest tax.  Furthermore, this tax was
construed as an obligation between two people, not as a return from the land
(Gavingnaud, 1983, p. 104).  As the number of small landholders grew in this
way, the traditional relationship between lord and vassal lost all but its symbolic
meaning.
Lured by the higher prices obtained in viticulture, small farmers
abandoned the more traditional cereal cultivation.  As a result, poor harvests
threatened famine while bumper crops caused wine price collapses because of
over-production.  During much of the 18th century, civil authority attempted to
redirect agriculture by prohibiting new planting of grape vines, but a marked
increase in wine production compared to a mere 2% official increase in
cultivated land suggests widespread noncompliance (Gavingnaud, 1983, pp. 134,
141).  Despite the relative increase in grain prices that accompanied this
dynamic, small farmers persisted in viticulture.  One explanation for their
8persistence is that the technology of cereal production as early as the 19th
century required a larger minimum efficient scale and so was not a practical
alternative, given the fragmented state of land ownership.  Equally possible is
that plots were so small that cereal cultivation could not meet subsistence; so
farmers gambled on the more lucrative (and more variable) returns to
winemaking.3
Markets for the sale of wine date to the ninth century, but significant
exportation emerged in the late Middle Ages during English occupation and the
Hundred Years’ War (Ulin, 1986, p. 26).  This market development and
expansion allowed monocropping in wine where previously it had been only a
supplement to subsistence-oriented farming. Expansion of the export market
allowed for the beginnings of labor specialization.  This commercial activity
centered in Bordeaux, and the contemporaneous repercussions on the wine
industry in the Midi are unclear.  Still, culturally, this market development
created the institutions that would characterize wine production in the Midi
once inland transportation expanded the domestic market.  Broadly speaking,
the critical institutional developments consisted of landless labor force, usually
share-croppers or tenants with use rights, and a merchant class in the sale of
wine.4
                                                 
3 A similar dynamic caused small US farmers to plant cotton after the civil war, contributing to
depressed cotton prices in the ensuing decades.  (See Wright and Kunreuther, especially p. 528.)
4Sivéry (1969) reconstructs the dynamics of a lively wine trade in the 14th century from the
accounting records of the barony of Hainaut, in what is now the northeastern part of France.
9Institutional Change and Industrial Restructuring
Two 18th-century events were seminal to the growth of wine cooperatives 150
years later.  One event was the Revolution of 1789 and the resulting institutional
transformations.  Reforms curtailed both use rights and vestigial feudal
obligations in favor of fee simple land tenure achieved through enclosure,
though the high concentration of land in the possession of a relative few,
compared to the large number of small landowners, did not change
(Gavingnaud, 1983, p. 197).  Perhaps more significantly, an entrepreneurial
merchant class with ready cash bought the estates previously held by landed
aristocrats.  These merchant-entrepreneurs expected a return from land
ownership that their aristocratic predecessors had not.  Proprietors regarded
post-Revolution vineyards as an investment, not a heritage.  The sale of church
lands, including substantial vineyard acreage, hastened this transition to
capitalist viticulture.  These institutional transformations generated inertia, as
winegrowers lobbied for, and received, tax and regulatory reforms that further
increased the viticulturists' ability to expand vineyard acreage  (Gavingnaud,
1983, p. 205).
The other 18th-century event was the introduction of the Grands Crus
appellations, elaborated over the course of the 19th century, which conferred
prestige upon vineyards capable of meeting prescribed guidelines.  Responding
to international competition, the government intended this classification to
maintain prices by creating at least the perception of higher quality.  Since
10
guidelines required specialized labor to rationalize each step of the process,
Grands Crus legislation formally separated the unified process of wine
cultivation and production (Ulin, 1988, p. 254).  Specialized knowledge
separated vine trimmers from grape harvesters, and neither shared the expertise
of the wine maker.  Approved vines were 50-100 years old and produced a
smaller yield, directly improving the quality of the wine.  Grands Crus guidelines
typically required that the wine be aged for several years, thus imposing
carrying costs and the additional capital requirements of storage facilities.  Large
estates operated at a scale of production large enough to support this increased
division of labor and level of capital investment, while small growers did not.
As a result, estates enjoyed the rents accruing to the Grands Crus appellations,
while small growers minimized their comparative disadvantage by producing
lower quality table wines, which had higher yields and required less storage
since they were drunk young.  This production-side market segmentation
persisted through much of the nineteenth century; large-scale estates produced
quality wines, and small-scale winemakers, table wine.  Nonetheless, periodic
crises of overproduction contributed to a consolidation of the industry.  Well-
capitalized estates bought the assets of small proprietors who were less able to
withstand financial losses.  In this way, large estates augmented and
consolidated their holdings, while small growers clung to dispersed plots, an
artifact of France’s tradition of partable inheritance (Landes, 1969, p. 189).
The Phylloxera Epidemic and Economic Dislocation
11
A remarkable increase in wine production occurred in the fifteen years leading
up to the vine devastation that was first reflected in the 1876 harvest (Warner,
1960, p. 2).  Railroad transport spurred both domestic consumption and
international wine trade, and facilitated the concentration of production in the
Midi, where climate and high-yielding varieties made high-volume production
of wine feasible (Gavingnaud, 1983, p. 279).  This increase in the extent of the
market created arbitrage possibilities that négociants quickly exploited.  They
bought in large volume and then resold to wholesalers in urban centers, creating
a marketing network that would ultimately monopolize the sale of wine to
distant markets (Gavingnaud, 1983, pp. 300-1).
Besides transforming production and marketing arrangements, increased
commerce also created mechanisms for spreading various plant diseases and
infestations.  The Phylloxera blight of the 1870’s and 80’s seems to have been
imported from the US, where vines were immune to its effects.  The French vines
were not, and winegrowers’ dramatic response to this epidemic transformed
viticulture in a way that threatened the coexistence of the two scales of wine
production.  Phylloxera wiped out large vineyards with alarming speed, while
curative measures such as flooding the root stocks and treating them with
chemicals only slowed the disease’s progression. Public and private
organizations pursued scientific research on a scale unprecedented in French
agriculture and established a policy role for research.  Charles K. Warner writes,
“A marked policy of governmental intervention was born during the phylloxera;
12
meanwhile the phylloxera was creating conditions that would make the policy
less and less timid” (1960, p. 8).  The blight and the effort to combat it
demonstrated that the industry’s viability was inextricably tied to increased
scientization.  Ultimately, growers ended the epidemic by grafting their vines
onto resistant American root stocks or by replanting altogether with the heartier
American varieties.  Growers hit particularly hard had further incentive to
replant with the lower quality American grapes because they would yield a
bigger harvest in fewer years than the more refined varieties, thus allowing
faster repayment of the loans required for replanting.  This turn of events thrust
large estates into direct competition with small growers as production of vin
ordinaire became the key to survival for large estates and small growers alike.
This high-yield reorientation of the wine industry contributed to a price
slump lasting from 1900 through 1907.  This slump reached crisis proportions in
the Midi, which suffered disproportionately because of the negotiating weakness
of its many independent producers.  The 1907 revolt of the Midi, in which
hundreds of thousands participated, ended with “demonstrators gunned down
by occupying troops” (Johnson, 1995, p. 241).  On average, prices dropped by as
much as 50% of what they had been in the previous decade (Warner, 1960, p.19).
Wine fraud, the production of second and third wines by adding sugar and
water to the lees, was a second aggravating factor endogenous to the domestic
industry (Warner, 1960, p. 13).  Faced with weak prices, many producers tried to
compensate for falling or negative margins with increased volume of false
13
wines.  The exacerbating effect of increased supply as a response to falling
prices, although inevitable in the aggregate, did not deter individual producers
from gambling that they could improve their returns in this way.
Dynamics exogenous to the domestic market also depressed prices.  First,
unusually good weather at the turn of the century produced good harvests, the
traditional source of overproduction.  Additionally, the advent of  wine
importation from Algeria introduced further price competition.  The Algerian
wines were cheaper and of a higher alcohol content than the French table wines.
The appeal of these wine imports was not limited to French consumers,
however.  As Algerian exports to third countries rose, French exports to those
same countries predictably fell.  Other nations, too, and notably Italy, increased
exports to France.  The genesis of this international competition seems to have
been the Phylloxera, devastating enough to raise world prices and spur new
planting in unaffected countries.  Weakened demand increased the downward
price pressure caused by wine imports.  The distillers of other alcoholic
beverages, traditionally wine-buyers of last resort, had converted their
operations to the use of beet and grain alcohol because of the high wine prices
prevailing during the Phylloxera.  Previously, their high elasticity of demand for
wine had caused them to increase purchases dramatically when large harvests
and low wine prices prevailed; but technological and agricultural advances
14
made during the phylloxera epidemic ensured that grape wine, even during
price slumps, would remain more expensive than other sources of alcohol.5
Collective Response
Private and governmental crackdown on fraud, and government restrictions on
imports, combined with a return to less spectacular growing conditions ended
the price slump by 1907.  But among winegrowers, the seeds of cooperation had
already been planted—not yet in the actual production of wine, but already as
an institutional means of combating unwelcome market forces.  In the Midi,
various committees sprang up to organize revolts against a perceived lack of
government action in response to the crisis.  Just before the 1907 harvest, these
committees succeeded in forming the Confédération Générale des Vignerons du
Midi (CGV), whose primary aim was to combat wine fraud.  A secondary aim
was to lobby the French government for favorable legislation (Warner, 1960, p.
45).  Thanks to aggressive, effective, and public anti-fraud enforcement, the CGV
label came to represent quality, if not prestige, and membership exploded as a
result.  By 1912 its membership had grown to 20,000, representing 425
winegrowing communities (Warner, 1960, 47).
Mobilization for World War I disrupted but did not end the relative
prosperity that had evolved among winegrowers.  Wartime requisitions
maintained demand, and wine gained cultural status as a morale-builder.  At
                                                 
5 Distillation of grape alcohol would later resume thanks to government-subsidized mandatory
distillation.
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war’s end, neglected vineyards and pent-up demand for wine caused spot prices
to rise.  Higher prices prompted farmers to increase their planting, however,
creating the potential for renewed overproduction.  If crises of overproduction
were a tolerable risk to small growers after the Revolution, they were clearly
unbearable by the advent of the 20th century when large estates could and did
flood the market with vin ordinaire, taking advantage of marketing ties and high-
volume contracts to sell their output.  Small growers, already at a production
cost disadvantage, could not combat the market power of the estates and “were
often cheated by local commission agents who procured wines for large
wholesalers” (Loubère et al, 1985, p. 142).  Unable to withstand recurring losses,
many small growers responded by abandoning the vineyard to pursue wage
labor in the growing cities.
Although economic forces shaped the environment in which cooperatives
would later thrive, public policy initiatives were not without influence on the
cooperative movement.  Government officials were eager to stem the migration
of farmers to urban centers because they feared urban unemployment would
mean social unrest.  Elected officials, therefore, had an interest in stabilizing
wine prices and production in order to prevent a rural exodus.  The national
French government and municipal authorities backed an organizational
innovation that had met with some success in its initial articulations, namely, the
cave coopérative vinicole, which combined independent viticulture with
cooperative vinification and marketing.  Between 1920 and 1939 the number of
16
such cooperatives increased from 82 to 827 (Loubère et al, 1985, 137).  Although
these cooperatives required some initial investment from their founding
members, national grants and loans from Crédit Agricole provided most of the
start-up financing.  The government provided this financing to cooperatives that
adopted modern production methods and agreed to participate in reforms
designed to stabilize wine prices.  Perhaps most significant from a public policy
perspective was that “wine cooperatives would provide . . . the very institutional
medium through which limitations could be levied on the quantity of
production through the cooperatives centralized administration” (Ulin, 1996, p.
87).
The Ministry of Agriculture promulgated a standardized charter for
vinification cooperatives that local organizers could modify as necessary.  (For
an example, see Ulin, 1996, p. 151.)  Typical cooperatives required capital
contributions from new members to finance some portion of the plant, property,
and equipment used in vinification.  They frequently required that members
deliver their entire harvest to the cooperative.  In return, members received a
predetermined per-liter price, which varied according to sugar content.  The
cooperative’s employees supervised the remaining production and marketing.
Usually, a university trained œnologist controlled the technical aspects of
fermentation, and marketing staff negotiated sales, either of casks or bottles.
Members would then receive a prorated share of any residual profits remaining
after payment of administrative and overhead expenses.  The sole means of
17
obtaining a return from cooperative membership is, therefore, the sale of grapes
to the cooperative.  This arrangement improves the organizational stability of the
cooperative since farmers will not sell out simply to realize capital gains6.
The Theory
In this section, I show that the restructuring represented by cooperative
winemaking was a progressive response to market conditions, not evidence of
the entrepreneurial failure that Landes (1969) alleges.  First I address changes in
the competitive environment.  I argue that market and nonmarket forces
combined to determine which producers would survive the dislocation that
followed the phylloxera.  Second, I discuss the impact of changes in production
technology.  Third, I illustrate the influence of demand characteristics on the
economic organization of winemaking, and portray the vinification cooperative
as a response to this influence.  Last, I analyze the fitness of the cooperative form
of organization as compared to alternative governance structures.  The
cooperative form was better suited, I hold, than any of these to the institutional
context of winemaking.
Changes in the Competitive Environment
Government intervention to protect small growers and facilitate the
formation of cooperatives weakened the competitive pressures that otherwise
would have shaped the industry early in this century.  Nelson and Winter
                                                 
6 Ellerman (1984, p. 885) and Estrin and Jones (1992) discuss the tendency of producer
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observe, “[M]arkets can be judged as working well or poorly depending on the
extent to which the profitability of a firm hinges on its ability to meet customer
demands as well as or better than its rivals” (1982, p. 268).  The critical role of
government intervention in behalf of small winemakers weakened linkages
between economic performance and survival.  But the market discipline of profit
and loss would not have been efficient in any case.  Given that crop insurance
was not available, and because of the volatility of total wine production and
therefore of prices, survival would depend more on the ability to self-insure
against periodic losses than on low-cost production of a desired product.  Efforts
by the government to stabilize prices were largely ineffective until after World
War II, so governmental support of cooperatives merely reduced the
comparative disadvantage lesser-capitalized producers faced as a result of this
price volatility.
Not even the considerable favor conferred on small farmers by civil
authorities immunized them from domestic competition, however. Big players in
the industry defined the competitive environment.  Large estates began to sell
vin de table after the phylloxera epidemic since they had replanted with the more
resilient, higher yielding, but lower quality American grapes.  The resulting
collapse of the price umbrella their higher quality wines had provided increased
price competition.  Accordingly, margin pressures permitted less variation in
production methods.  Winemakers who continued to produce and market
                                                                                                                                      
cooperatives to “degenerate” into capitalist firms.
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favorably differentiated wines were not subject to this discipline.  For example,
because of name recognition, small Bordeaux region farmers received a higher
price, a premium that allowed more flexibility in their choice of production
methods.  As a result, the rationale for cooperative vinification and marketing
was not as strong in Bordeaux, and, indeed, cooperatives are not nearly as
common in that region as they were in the Midi (Loubère et al, 1985, p. 149).
Although government intervention and successful product differentiation
relieved some competitive pressures, market outcomes were not irrelevant to the
viability of vinification cooperatives, since profitability was ultimately the key to
survival.  Agricultural techniques varied little from château to small farmer, and
vintners only sold a small portion of their output directly to retailers or
consumers, so middlemen, or négociants, played the decisive role in picking
winners and losers.  Therefore, it was at this level of wholesale marketing that
the market imposed discipline on winemakers.  Institutional inertia in the critical
areas of land tenure, viticulture, and vinification could proceed unchecked,
except as they impacted on the critical stage of marketing.
Changes in Production Technology
Technological innovation causes organizational change by shifting the basis for
competition.  Margins on which competitive pressures are weak may become
critical to a firm’s survival if technological advances along those margins confer
cost advantage or otherwise increase the profitability of firms that adopt the new
20
technology.  As the basis for competition changes, dynamic efficiency may not
only require a change in product or process technology but, more significantly, a
change in organizational form.  For centuries, scale of production in winemaking
had not been a margin on which competitive pressures operated.  Beginning
with the phylloxera, the principal cause of increased competition in vin ordinaire,
technological advances brought competitive pressures to bear the scale of
vinification activities.  Economic forces threatened to drive the small
independent winemaker out of business.  The impetus for caves coopératives was
in governmental promotion of modern production methods, but the source of
their longevity lies in the differing MES of the production stages, and in the
rewards of effective wholesale marketing.
The minimum efficient scale of viticulture had not changed for centuries
and may have been smaller than that of other cash crops.  The firm-specific
threshold model states that small farms will not invest in mechanized equipment
because higher fixed costs per unit of output would outweigh the labor savings.
At some higher threshold acreage, saved labor costs would just offset the
average fixed costs of mechanization (David, 1966).  Proponents of small-scale
inefficiency arguments might accept this as a reason why tractors were not
common in French viticulture until the 1950’s (Ulin, 1996, p. 136).  Regarding
scale of production in grape farming, one researcher notes, “That a typical wine
estate would have up to twenty times more land than a peasant farm was less
significant than that the parcels were located in the same area,” thus reducing
21
wear and tear on machinery and allowing for more systematic planting (Yoon,
1975, p. 82).  Yoon also contends that some American grape-picking machines
could only be used on large plots.  But recent scholarship suggests that the firm-
specific threshold model may not apply to mechanization in agriculture because
of joint ownership arrangements and the availability of independent contractors
for harvesting (Olmstead and Rhode, 1995).  Indeed, Ulin notes “a group of
growers from Listrac have pooled their resources to buy equipment that they
could not afford alone.  This works well as long as the members are careful to
plan when the equipment will be used by whom” (1996, p. 134).  Thus, even
small farmers could share the benefits of innovation in agricultural equipment as
it became available.  By contrast, the minimum efficient scale of vinification
increased dramatically because of technological factors and marketing
considerations.
A divergence in minimum efficient scales within a unified production
process has implications for economies of scope and may produce dis-
integration.  When the larger MES is downstream, smaller-scaled upstream
products will tend to modularize, while the downstream process will act as an
interface that combines the modular inputs to produce a uniform product.  In his
explication of the factory system, Leijonhufvud notes, “specialization of labor in
team production will require standardization of product” (1986, p. 209, emphasis
original).  In vinification cooperatives, it was the other way around:
standardization of product required increased specialization of labor.
22
The primacy of specialization of labor versus standardization of product
is neither a chicken-and-egg phenomenon nor an arbitrary ordering that reflects
basic interdependence.  When increased specialization of labor drives the
reorganization of industry, cost reduction is the goal, and standardization of
output is a necessary, though often valueless, byproduct.  For example, I care not
at all whether the stitching on my glove matches yours; it is enough that my
glove fits me.  By contrast, when standardization of product is itself desired by
the consumer (the négociant in the example of vinification), then the goal of
restructuring is to increase demand and raise price, not to lower costs.  Thus the
process of industrial development that created the factory system fundamentally
differs from the dynamic through which cottage winemakers formed
cooperatives.  Price elasticities of demand help explain the difference.  As
Langlois and Robertson (1995, p. 104) note, price inelasticity of demand favors
organizational inertia since cost savings would not increase sales
proportionately.  Thus, cooperative winegrowers retained the institutions of
independent viticulture and private farmland while increasing the market value
of their fermented product.
Although I argue that the vinification cooperatives have as their aim to
increase price, some more-or-less incidental cost savings did result.  As already
noted, the technology of vinification emerging at the beginning of the twentieth
century increased the capital intensity of the process. Agricultural labor from
Italy and Spain was available for hire, but capital was scarce, consisting only of
23
the land and the vines for most growers (Ulin, 1986, n., p.28).  Gavingnaud refers
to the viticulturist as “a capitalist without capital” (1983, p. 293).  The move to
cooperative vinification was capital-saving.  The geometry of volume ensures
that larger hoppers, vats, and storage facilities will yield economies of scale,
thereby conserving capital, provided the firm can amortize the costs of these
investments over a sufficiently high volume of product.
Although capital-saving for the industry, larger vinification facilities
required increased concentration of capital.  Because of financial capital market
institutions, the move to capital-intensive vinification technology created
incentives to reorganize ownership.  Capital requirements necessitated large
borrowing, and government grants and guarantees were easily available to
cooperatives, whose combined resources could collateralize large outlays.
Cooperatives thus overcame barriers to the concentration of capital.
Additionally, whereas dispersed ownership was resistant to rapid
dissemination of technical change, reorganized ownership that included a
collective entity allowed the French government to provide more than capital.
Vinification cooperatives provided the institutional means to disseminate the
benefits of national agricultural research to the small farmer.  In this way,
vinification cooperatives resembled a “venture capital network” with the
government as the capitalist.  Cooperatives allowed producers to respond en
masse to changes in technology and consumer demand.  The government
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believed that modern technology would keep small winegrowers competitive
and thus designed its support of cooperatives to encourage modernization.
Changes in Demand Characteristics
Changes in demand characteristics increased the MES of vinification.
Increasingly impersonal, rivalrous, and brand-based marketing strategies
accompanied the négociants’ rise to power.  Effective marketing in wine requires
conformity to interrelated quantitative and qualitative standards.  Thus
development of channels for mass marketing required uniform quality both
within a vintage and from year to year.  Pooling grapes from many farms
improves the uniformity of the fermented product, effectively making the
cooperative more than the sum of its parts.  Additionally, proportioning the
volume of the finished product to the volume required by the wholesale market
adds economic value.  Growers are thus suppliers of complementary inputs.
The entire produce of a small farm will not be large enough for a négociant
to consider, but when farmers vinify collectively and accumulate a much larger
inventory of a uniform product, many brokers will bid up the price.  An increase
in the scale of production thus generates higher effective demand and brings
higher profits, without necessarily changing per unit costs of production, the
traditional source of economies of scale.  In the case of the French winegrowers,
big players on the demand side thus influenced the supply-side selection
mechanism through institutional change in marketing and wholesaling.  Since
only a unified vinification process could produce wine of uniform quality, the
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scale of marketing activity had implications for the scale of the production
process itself.
The reader will note that the analysis that follows critically depends on
the contention that larger batches fetched a higher per-unit price in the
wholesale wine market.  My evidence for this contention is anecdotal, perhaps
necessarily so, as comparative price data is unavailable.  For example, Loubère
notes,
[I]n the lower Midi . . . members allowed the cooperative to
sell their wines because it was in a better bargaining
position vis-à-vis the shippers and almost always won a
higher price.  Most merchants were by no means reluctant to
do business with well-run cooperatives.  They recognized
the advantage of getting a better product and, just as
important, a consistent one.  These benefits reduced their
costs of searching for suitable wines among many small
vintners and having to deal with so many different qualities
(1990, p. 140).
A graphical analysis illustrates the increased profitability of winemaking
cooperatives as a result of these demand-side factors.  The small, integrated
winemaker faces a nonlinear isoprofit curve (Figure 1).  The nonlinearity occurs
at that scale of production where a firm produces wine in sufficient volume to be
demanded by the large négociants.  I have presented this nonlinear isoprofit
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curve as a kinked curve for the sake of clarity, but one could model this
threshold as part of a continuous isoprofit function without qualitatively
changing the production decision.
f(h,k)
r0
(H*, K*)
liters
h,k
a
(hf, kf)
Figure 1.  The small artisanal winemaker
The small wine grower and producer faces a production function f(h,k)
that depends on the number of hectares under cultivation (h) and the level of
capital investment in vinification equipment (k).  The kinked isoprofit curve for
profit r0 is tangential to the farmer’s production function at point a, which
corresponds to a scale of production labeled (hf, kf).  At scales of production
marginally above and below (hf, kf), profit decreases as the farmer is forced onto
a lower isoprofit curve.  Thus marginal incentives lead the farmer to scale (hf, kf),
although we see that the farm could reach a higher isoprofit curve by producing
at (H*, K*).  Even with perfect information about the isoprofit curve, a constraint
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on either acreage or capital below H* or K*, respectively, would force the
winegrower back to (hf, kf).
f(h,k)
r1
hf hi
*
liters
hectares
a
b
Figure 2.  The Cooperative Viticulturist
The cooperative farmer, by contrast, faces a flat isoprofit curve, the lower
slope of which is given by the higher price the cooperative offers (Figure 2).
Ceteris paribus, this leads the farmer to expand the scale of viticulture, while
divesting himself of the vinification capital.  The cooperative sets a price such
that Shi*= H*, yielding the production shown in Figure 3.  Lest the price-taking
behavior of these farmers towards the cooperative seem naive, Mendras has
observed, “Their wine is not treated as a particular product that deserves a
particular evaluation; most farmers think that prices cannot be discussed,
‘they’re already set.’  And when they bring their grapes to the cooperative their
product is out of their hands even before it exists; they furnish only the raw
material” (1970, p. 189).
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f(h,k)
r1
liters
h,k(H
*, K*)
Figure 3.  The Vinification Cooperative
The cave coopérative thus attains the globally optimal isoprofit curve, r1,
generating a higher return for its members than they could have achieved
independently.
Although in this model the scale of vinification is central to obtaining
higher prices, the scale of viticulture has no relevant impact on marketing
considerations.  In fact, French winemakers, in order to diversify against the
risks posed by the weaknesses inherent in particular varieties, have long planted
and blended several grape varieties, varieties which might just as well come
from scattered plots in a village as from the unified vineyards of a single
château.  This tradition of blending explains their labeling of wine according to
locale of origin rather than variety of grape, a practice that also avoids
commoditization of their product.
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Brand maintenance then becomes the impetus for putting only the best
grapes under the most prestigious label, and so on down the line.  Impersonal
markets, mediated by négociants, increased the potential value of branding as a
means of differentiating the product and combating fraud.  For a brand to have
value, however, it must denote not only a central tendency but also a limited
variation.  The critical contribution of the cave cooperative to brand
identification was in limiting variation in the finished product.  French
authorities followed the precedent set by the Grands Crus guidelines in drafting
the Apellation d’Origine legislation of this century.  Although coopératives began
by producing table wine, by the 1980’s many were eligible to produce Vin
d’Apellation d’Origine Controlée (AOC).  Many coopératives now even produce
château-labeled wines, a practice that requires separate vinification of the
harvest of a single grower.  A fuller discussion of the economics of brands is
beyond the scope of this paper.7
Though clearly not achievable in an absolute sense because of the
vicissitudes of nature, increased scientization in the vinification process can
improve consistency from year to year.  Temperature control, proper blending,
and other technical manipulations can all compensate for characteristics of the
harvest in such a way as to improve consistency from year to year.  Without
scientific manipulation, variations from one year’s harvest to the next are fully
                                                 
7 The intricate system of French brand legislation raises transactions costs issues such as those
discussed by Barzel (1983).  The the impact of brands on measurement costs may indicate that
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expressed in the final product, making the wine less consistently marketable and
reducing the value of the brand.  The cooperative allows a specialization of labor
that makes such manipulation feasible.
A Comparative-Organizational Analysis
As Coase has noted, “The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm
would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism” (1937, p.
390).  Knowledge about prices, while easily transferable, may not have been
freely available to small wine producers.  One study of winegrower behavior
revealed that “there was a strong correlation between the purchase of
instruments of production (fertilizer, machines and so on) and purchasing
power based on the previous year’s crop; the correlation between the [prevailing]
price of wine and such purchases is much weaker” (Mendras, 1970, p. 82,
emphasis added).  Historians who fault the family firm’s inability or
unwillingness to secure debt financing would not find this revealing (for
example, Landes, 1969, p. 147).  But this lagged response to prices suggests
imperfect information more than it does credit market imperfections or
underutilization.  Given the easy credit provided by Crédit Agricole and other
agencies, one may infer that current price information was either unavailable or
believed to be unreliable.
                                                                                                                                      
French vintners may be “over-branding” in the way that consumers may engage in “over-
sorting,” for example.
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The vinification cooperative reduced coordination costs arising from such
price uncertainty.  In a dynamic akin to the Lucas (1973) “islands model,”
atomistic producers had little knowledge about the level of wine production
outside their community.  A bumper crop construed as a relative increase in
production would mean capturing a larger market share, whereas general
increases in production heralded only impoverishment as the relatively inelastic
demand for wine guaranteed low prices.  But costs of using the price system are
greater for an independent vintner than for the cooperative.  Confederations of
cooperatives, such as the Fédération des Caves Coopératives de Vinification des
Pyrénées-Orientales (Gavingnaud, 1983, p. 489), were able to aggregate
production data before sending wine to market.  Better production data enabled
cooperatives, in accordance with government mandates, to hold back some
portion of the vintage when oversupply conditions existed.  The cooperative
would either release such hold-backs to the market at a later date or sell them to
the spirits industry for distillation in accordance with government programs.
Small independent wine makers had neither the information nor the storage
facilities necessary to efficiently regulate the flow of product to market.
Cooperative vinification, and the information consolidation function served by
the network of cooperatives, reduced the extent of disequilibrium by improving
private and governmental organizations’ ability to forecast production and
prices.  In this way, cooperative vinification reduced the cost of using the price
mechanism and thus enhanced efficiency, irrespective of its technological merits.
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The vinification cooperative is clearly not the only form of organization
capable of reducing the cost of using the price mechanism.  Therefore, one must
consider a range of organizational alternatives if one is to evaluate the efficiency
of this particular form.  These alternatives vary along two dimensions.  First,
they vary according to the extent of vertical integration, which is to say,
according to the tightness of the governance structure.  Second, they vary
according to the role owners play in the organization’s productive activity.  In
the analysis that follows, I consider three alternatives to the cooperative form of
organization.  These three alternatives represent different combinations of
integration and ownership in winemaking.
Prior to the emergence of vinification cooperatives, winemakers formed
cooperatives that provided storage space and marketing services, and that
increased the political influence of independent winemakers.  These early
cooperatives, which did not undertake vinification, provide the first
organizational alternative I want to consider.  The winemakers owned the
cooperative, but operations were less integrated since the farmers fermented
their own grapes.  And although these early cooperatives collectivized the
storage and marketing functions, members paid rental fees for storage space and
accounted for sales on a consignment basis.  Unlike organizations supplying
only cooperative storage and marketing facilities, vinification cooperatives were
able to dampen price fluctuations by withholding wine from market in times of
oversupply.  Winegrowers needed storage facilities both to age the better
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varieties and to stabilize prices by regulating the flow of product to market.
Independent, for-profit storage facilities could not serve this function because
only coordinated, cartel-like control of supply affects price.  With plentiful
storage space available for rent, individual farmers would have incentive to
cheat by increasing their volume for sale.  Indeed, this was the plight of early
cooperatives that provided storage and marketing without coordinating
production.  By contrast, the governance structure of vinification cooperatives
and the larger regional associations to which they belonged allowed them to
manage the flow of product to market to a degree that cooperative storage
facilities could not.
Seen from this point of view, cooperative vinification and marketing was
a solution to the prisoner’s dilemma of overproduction.  Even if production
information could be instantly and costlessly disseminated, individual
winemakers would have incentive to cheat.  Cooperative vinification and
marketing integrated the fortunes of separate growers by compensating them
according to a schedule set as a function of collective volume and market
conditions.  Cheating could still pay, of course, but in general the incentive to
cheat diminishes as the decision-making entity becomes a larger proportion of
the market and so bears a larger percentage of the costs of its own cheating.  The
monitor who changes the payoffs to the cooperative growers is the cooperative
itself.
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The capital requirements of a higher MES for vinification might indicate
that an independent organization that would buy grapes from many farmers
should undertake vinification.  This is the second organizational alternative I
consider.  An independently owned vinification facility would be less vertically
integrated than the vinification cooperative, and those who control the
vinification and marketing would also own the firm.  A variation on this
structure would incorporate investors of capital who would own the facility
without having control of day-to-day operations.  At first blush, either
arrangement might seem an efficient alternative to the vinification cooperative.
The technology of, and the capabilities required for, viticulture and vinification
had been diverging since the introduction of Grands Crus guidelines.  Given
increased specialization of this sort, separate ownership of viticulture and
vinification processes would add profit incentive to the decision authority of
both management groups.  But independent vinification facilities were not
feasible.  Vintners had to crush and ferment grapes as quickly as possible after
harvest, especially when white wine is produced; and since refrigerated
transport was not available, this time exigency would have limited the
geographical reach of the firm.  Indeed, in Languedoc intra-regional rail service
was slow and unreliable for a variety of historical reasons.  (See Johnson, 1995,
ch. 7.)  An independent vinification facility, constrained in its geographic reach,
would have faced threats of holdup at the hands of local growers.  Thus asset
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site-specificity disfavored establishment of independent vintners.8  One might
also consider the threat of monopsony power.  Again: because of limited market
area, a single regional firm could behave opportunistically toward its suppliers.
Hansmann (1988) analyzes American dairy cooperatives as a response to this
kind of monopsony power.
Even if the hazards of asset specificity and opportunism could have been
dealt with contractually, the structure of the wine production industry might
have promoted non-traditional governance structures.  Michael Spence (1976)
has theorized that some socially desirable services are more likely to be
produced by clubs than by profit-seeking firms.  Vinification services may fall
into this category of “club goods.”  Spence refers to the inability of independent,
profit-seeking firms to perfectly price discriminate, and thus take into account
society’s total surplus when deciding whether or not to produce.  When a firm
cannot perfectly price discriminate, some inelastically demanded services will
not be produced, even if the total costs of production would be less than the total
surplus.  Clubs, or in this case cooperatives, can overcome this difficulty because
they “do not use the pure price system” (Spence, 1976, p. 410).  Independent
vinification facilities would face a relatively small market and inelastic demand
curve, a function of fixed vineyard acreage and limited geographical extent of
the market.  If the profit-maximizing price such an independent facility could
charge its customers was not sufficiently above its cost for grapes to cover fixed
                                                 
8 For an explanation of asset site specificity, see Williamson (1985), especially p. 95.
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costs, farmers could agree to transfer some of their surplus.  But significant
transactions costs would attend the negotiation and execution of such a transfer,
owing to information asymmetries, among other factors.  These transactions
costs are what Spence argues favor club or non-profit provision of services.  In
the case of vinification cooperatives, farmers assume ownership of the facility,
allowing a relatively costless transfer of surplus sufficient to sustain the
cooperative’s operations.
The vinification cooperative arrangement may contradict Barzel’s maxim
that whoever is in a position to affect the odds the most will own under
uncertainty (Barzel, 1987).  The cooperative marketing and administration are
the entities charged with combating the uncertainty created by international
competition, market power, and fluctuations in national and world production.
The member-owners of the cooperative affect only the odds of obtaining a
salable harvest under varying natural conditions.  Barzel’s analysis is not strictly
applicable to the vinification cooperative because of latter’s separation of
ownership and effective control.  The winegrowers are the owners and residual
claimants, but they take little interest in the day-to-day operations of the
cooperative (Ulin, 1986, p. 34).  Their lack of involvement may simply reflect the
transactions costs of governance.  “When there are many residual claimants, it is
costly for all of them to be involved in decision control and it is efficient for them
to delegate decision control” (Fama and Jensen, 1983, p. 309).  Those in the best
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position to affect the odds do effectively control the relevant aspects of the
cooperative.
This observation raises the question, why should the cooperative
administrators not own the firm, lending profit incentive to their decision
authority?  I have already given a partial answer regarding the hazards of asset
site specificity for the vinification facility.  But forward integration into grape
farming would eliminate those hazards.  Thus, the third organizational
alternative I address is the a fully-integrated wine growing and wine making
firm owned by executive administrators.  An efficiency explanation for
preferring the vinification cooperative to this form relies on the economic value
of preserving the institution of small, independent viticulture.
The preservation of small, independent growers is an instance of “flexible
specialization,” where a smaller scale of production is preserved for the sake of
inherent variety in what the organization needs to accomplish (Piore and Sabel,
1984).  Small vineyards are tied to dispersed knowledge, which will only be
used efficiently if growers retain residual claimant status.  Each plot may have
idiosyncratic characteristics to which the proprietor is accustomed to
responding.  Small proprietors whose families tended plots and vines for
generations developed tacit knowledge about the interaction of soil, climate and
weather with the particular vines panted there.  This knowledge of what the
French call terroir could not be easily codified, and was connected to the first-
hand experience of tending the vines under a variety of different conditions.  In
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Oliver Williamson’s (1985) terminology, we are speaking here of “human asset
specificity,” while David Teece (1986, p. 188) might say that the farmer and his
plot are “cospecialized assets”.  Whatever the terminology, cooperative owners
had the ability and incentive to use their idiosyncratic knowledge to maximize
the yield from their vineyards when unpredictable growing conditions called for
creative reactions.  Frank Knight aptly describes the rationale for farmer
ownership of the cooperative in his maxim, “You can’t hire judgment.”
The skills required of oenologists and cooperative administrators are
technically defined to a greater degree than those of the wine grower.  The
scientific oenologist is charged with adhering to chemical specifications, while
the grower’s role is more artistic than technical.  Agricultural science certainly
aides the grower, but matters of quasi-artistic judgment concerning extent and
timing are more relevant to viticulture than to vinification.  The importance of
such judgment may explain the residual claimant status of growers in the
cooperative.  Their status is not unlike that of corporate shareholders in the
following respect: although relinquishing control of day-to-day operations, they
retain a credible threat of ousting management.  Vitaliano (1983) provides an
analysis of how the threat of replacing management or merging with
neighboring cooperatives effectively constrains managers from extracting
nonpecuniary rents from cooperative enterprises.
Decentralized ownership may seem likely to undercut efficiency, as no
doubt it often does.  But owing to the importance of tacit knowledge and
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economic capabilities in viticulture, decentralization in this field turns out to
have the opposite effect.  A focus on the importance of capabilities in
organizational evolution suggests that “[t]he role of professional management in
this process is, in fact, a centrifugal not a centripetal one.  Once the large-scale
investments have been made, once the economic capabilities have been forcibly
rearranged, the imperative then becomes one of decentralization” (Langlois, 1991,
p. 523, emphasis original).  In the case of vinification cooperatives, government
intervention, not professional management, is largely responsible for the forcible
rearrangement of capabilities; but the decentralization imperative is embedded
in the very structure of ownership.
Given such decentralized ownership, the efficiency of vinification
cooperatives would seem to hinge on the design of a compensation scheme that
could align incentives while promoting quality.  The efficiency of any variable
compensation scheme depends in part on the costs of measuring contributions
from individual claimants.  When individual contributions to the finished
product cannot be distinguished, individual contributions must be measured via
a proxy.  A distant proxy, such as labor hours in team production, may
encourage individual workers to shirk or free ride on the efforts of others.  (See
Alchian and Demsetz, 1972.)  Early vinification cooperatives benefited from an
easy, bright-line rule for allocating rents: weight adjusted for sugar content.  This
rule aligns incentives since the basis for remuneration is one that translates
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directly into economic value in the finished product.9  In other words, for vin
ordinaire, sugar content is a good proxy for quality.  Since more effort
maintenance is required the further the proxy is removed from the underlying
target variable, the ease of measuring a closely related proxy meant that the
cooperative expended minimal resources to monitor the efforts of its members.
The large, integrated wineries of California would seem to present a
challenge to the claims I have made above.  One conjectural response to this
challenge is that the role of local knowledge in the Midi’s wine cooperatives may
be greater than its role in west-coast wineries.  This would be the case if climatic
and soil conditions exhibited greater variation in the Midi.  Additionally,
capabilities exist in France for historical reasons that predate winemaking on the
West Coast.  That vinification cooperatives utilize this knowledge-base exhibits
path-dependence, but this path-dependence does not entail that cooperatives
will be less efficient than wineries that lack detailed local knowledge, and for
that reason organize themselves differently.  The same might be said of land
ownership structure.  If viticulture exhibits constant returns to scale even at very
low levels of production, nothing is gained by a consolidation of land holdings.
But neither do constant returns to scale inhibit the cultivation of large
consolidated holdings where such real estate is available, as in California.
Finally, in his book Trust, Francis Fukuyama (1995) presents compelling
                                                 
9 At least this was true prior to the 1980s, when many cooperatives began producing higher-
quality wines.  This reorientation required that the cooperatives measure and reward other
qualitative characteristics of the harvest.
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arguments for why different cultures tend to organize industry differently.  In
brief, his argument claims that cultural factors make large-scale enterprises
inefficient in France from a transactions cost point of view, while the history of
voluntary association in the US makes large integrated enterprises more viable.
Prospects for the future
One criterion for predicting the degree of organizational unity and central
direction at a given stage of production is the pace and kind of innovation.  The
dynamic rational for vinification cooperatives is “architectural innovation,”
Henderson and Clark’s term for a dynamic when innovation in the combining of
components is critical, but the components themselves change little.
Architectural innovation has allowed cooperatives to keep pace with scientific
advances in winemaking.  But this strength may decline in importance.
Advances in genetic engineering have expanded the ability to influence the
vinified product by breeding the right grapes, as opposed to tweaking the
vinification process.  (See Johnson and Halliday, 1992.)
Since the cooperative traditionally pays growers only according to the
volume and the sugar content of their harvest, farmers have no incentive to
innovate on other margins; in fact, they will economize on other margins, free-
riding on the quality of others’ grapes.  This limitation on innovation has become
important as cooperatives reorient themselves toward the production of quality
wines.  For cooperatives to survive, the proxy according to which farmers are
compensated must expand to include all relevant characteristics of the harvest.
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French researchers report that cooperatives are having some success with
measuring and rewarding other qualitative characteristics of the harvest.  (See
Temple et al, 1996.)
Just as marketing considerations dictated that farmers adopt a larger scale
of operation early in this century, new market forces are forcing cooperatives to
restructure.  Mere volume no longer commands the market premium that it once
did.  Instead, cooperatives must offer higher quality wines, varietal wines, or a
fuller range of products in order to obtain the best prices.  These imperatives
imply a yet larger scale of operation than most village cooperatives enjoy.  As a
result, mergers and technical change, both in viticulture and in vinification, have
swept through the industry.  Temple et al (1996) discuss these developments in
some detail.
The success or failure of this transformation will confirm or refute this
paper’s contention that vinification cooperatives were a progressive adaptation
to economic forces.  If the restructured cooperatives fail, one could conclude that
the cooperatives were, after all, merely a means of preserving local identity,
social stability, and traditional agriculture.  According to this view, the trend
toward consolidated, regional cooperatives that impose stricter guidelines on
members and encourage larger-scale cultivation undermines the cooperative’s
original raison d’être.  In opposition to my thesis, the failure of these mega-
cooperatives would suggest that cooperatives were, after all, conservative,
perhaps even backward.  If the current restructuring is successful, however, the
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cooperative form of organization will emerge as an institutional adaptation
whose success is more clearly based on economic efficiency.
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